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COMMENTS
Convergence and Divergence:
Blurring the Lines Between Hedge Funds
and Private Equity Funds
JONATHAN BEVILACQUAt
INTRODUCTION
Hedge funds and private equity funds have long been
treated as two distinct alternative investment categories.
Despite similar regulation under federal securities laws,
these two types of funds historically have had little else in
common. Private equity funds and hedge funds have
traditionally differed with respect to their investment
strategies, structures, and other fund terms.1 That is, until
now. Once completely separate asset classes, these two
styles of investing may be converging; some hedge fund
advisers are taking a more active role in their investments
t J.D. Candidate, State University of New York at Buffalo, 2006; B.B.A., Univ.
of Notre Dame, 2001; Chartered Financial Analyst. Thanks to the members of
the Buffalo Law Review for their editing assistance, helpful comments, and
constructive observations during the editing of this Comment. ©) 2006 by
Jonathan Bevilacqua.
1. Compare Andrew Brownstein et al., Private Equity Funds: Legal Analysis
of Structural, ERISA, and Securities Issues, in PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING:
LEGAL, FINANCIAL, & STRATEGIC TECHNIQUES FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING
(Practicing Law Institute ed., 1999) [hereinafter PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING],
with Scott J. Lederman, Hedge Funds, in FINANCIAL PRODUCT FUNDAMENTALS: A
GUIDE FOR LAWYERS § 11:2 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 2000).
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and directing fund assets to areas that were traditionally
occupied only by private equity advisers. 2
The hedge fund industry has experienced an enormous
growth in assets-particularly over the last decade 3-with
some experts estimating that hedge fund advisers now
manage close to one trillion dollars in roughly nine
thousand funds. 4 The large amount of capital that has
poured into hedge funds has attracted new entrants to the
industry, has led to the creation of new funds, and has
resulted in a more competitive investment environment. 5 In
order to meet their clients' return expectations, some hedge
fund advisers are moving away from traditional public
securities investing and expanding their universe of invest-
ment opportunities. 6
Hedge funds advisers are now devoting assets to less
liquid strategies, often holding large equity stakes in pri-
vate companies. 7 In effect, they are pursuing investments in
2. See George Saffayeh & Guy Lotem: A Marriage of Convenience: Private
Equity and Hedge Funds, CROSSCURRENTS, Winter 2005-06, at 14; see also
Matthew Judd, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Converge, in THE 2006 GUIDE
TO PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL, www.iflr.com (last visited Feb. 26,
2006); CURT CORNWELL ET AL., FINANCIER WORLDWIDE, THE CONVERGENCE
BETWEEN PRIVATE EQUITY AND HEDGE FUNDS (Dec. 2005), available at
www.financierworldwide.com; Dan Burch et al., The Convergence of Hedge
Funds and Its Impact on M&A (Oct. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Convergence of
Hedge Funds], available at www.deallawyers.com/member/Programs/Webcast;
Stephanie Breslow & Paul S. Gutman, Hedge Fund Investment in Private
Equity, in PRIVATE EQUITY 9 (2005-06), http://www.srz.com/files/ARTICLE-
PrivateEquity2005-06--HedgeFundlnvestmentInPrivateEquity.pdf.
3. See Erik J. Greupner, Hedge Funds Are Headed Down-Market: A Call for
Increased Regulation?, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1555, 1561, 1563 (2003) (stating
that an increase in hedge fund demand resulted from the 1990s bull market,
the resulting wealth creation, and the outperformance and low correlation that
many hedge funds achieved relative to traditional equity investments.).
4. Saffayeh & Lotem, supra note 2, at 15.
5. Judd, supra note 2, at 1 ("The huge inflows of capital into hedge funds...
and the proliferation of new hedge fund managers has increased competition in
the traditional hedge fund marketplace and brought down returns, forcing
hedge funds to diversify into new sources of return.").
6. See CORNWELL ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 ("Competition and the need for
higher returns have simply broadened the investment continuum for hedge
funds.").
7. Id. at 3 ("[H]edge funds now employ a much wider array of investment
strategies, having extended . . .to shareholder activism, distressed debt and
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areas typically dominated by advisers to private equity
funds.8 The traditional structure of hedge funds has also
begun to evolve. In some cases, hedge fund advisers are
incorporating "side pockets," "gates," and "lock-ups" to the
funds that they manage.9 These fund terms facilitate
illiquid investing, but blur the lines between the previously
well-defined structures of private equity funds and hedge
funds. Consequently, the once obvious distinction between
these two types of funds now lacks clarity.
Yet, while these funds are behaving more similar than
ever, the securities regulation framework under which they
operate has recently begun to diverge. The longstanding
policy of regulating hedge funds and private equity funds
almost identically under federal securities laws shifted on
December 2, 2004, when the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) released its final version 10  of a
controversial new rule and rule amendments under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act)."
Notwithstanding objections from many leaders in the
alternative investment management industry, the SEC, by
a three to two Commissioner vote, amended Rule 203(b)(3)-
I and added new Rule 203(b)(3)-2. 12 Effective February
2006, the new rule and rule amendments require the
registration of certain "private fund" investment advisers
with the SEC. 13 These rule changes were intended only to
impact investment advisers to hedge funds, specifically
venture capital and more recently, to private equity control, distressed
[investing] and leveraged loans.").
8. Id. at 1 ("The search for higher returns in a crowded field has pushed
hedge funds to consider alternative methods... [and] to shift from short-term
investments to longer, illiquid deployments. In doing so, many hedge funds are
now actively competing with buyout firms in the M&A market.").
9. Stephanie Breslow, Hedge Funds in Private Equity, available at
http://www.srz.com/publications/publicationsdetail.aspx?publicationId = 1503
(last visited Apr. 4, 2006) ("The increased participation by hedge funds in
private equity style investment strategies has been facilitated by a variety of
trends, including increased use of gates; use of longer (often rolling) lockups and
increased use of side pockets.").
10. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,055 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275,
279) [hereinafter Adopting Release].
11. 15 U.S.C. § 80b (2000).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203 (b)(3)-1, (b)(3)-2 (2005).
13. Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 72,070.
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allowing advisers to private equity funds to remain
unregistered. 14
The new rule and rule amendments are significant
since advisers to both types of funds were once able to avoid
registration by relying on the same exemption of the
Advisers Act. 15 Under Section 203(b)(3), hedge fund and
private equity fund advisers could take advantage of a
"private adviser exemption" to avoid registration provided
that they, among other things, advised fewer than fifteen
"clients" during the preceding twelve months. 16 The old
SEC rules pertaining to this section allowed both hedge
fund and private equity advisers to count a single legal
entity, which consisted of many investors, as a single
client. 17
The new rule changes create a "look through" provision
that requires only hedge fund advisers to look through the
legal entities they manage to determine the actual number
of investors.' 8 Hedge fund advisers are now required to
count each shareholder, limited partner, member, or
beneficiary of the fund as a client.' 9 In contrast, most
private equity advisers do not have to look through their
funds and can still count a fund as consisting of one client
for the purposes of the Advisers Act. 20 Thus, managers of
private equity funds can generally continue to avoid
registration as an investment adviser so long as they advise
fewer than fifteen funds.
14. Id. at 72,073.
15. Id. at 72,054.
16. Id. at 72,054-55.
17. Id. at 72,055. See also Definition of "Client" of an Investment Adviser for
Certain Purposes Relating to Limited Partnerships, 50 Fed. Reg. 29,206 (July
18, 1985); Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,112 (May 22, 1997).
18. Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 72,065.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 72,073.
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Despite a considerable amount of industry unrest 2' and
controversy, the SEC chose to single out only the advisers
to hedge funds. Before passing the rule changes, the SEC
produced a lengthy research report 22 and endured a heated
public comment on the proposed rule release23 that included
comments from individuals and organizations in the alter-
native investment management industry. 24 While there
were a considerable number of comments supporting the
proposal, the most detailed and opinionated comments
appeared to come from individuals and organizations that
opposed hedge fund adviser regulation. 25 However, this
Comment does not discuss the merits of the arguments for
21. See Comment Letter by the Managed Funds Association, The SEC's
Registration Proposal: The Public Commentary-A Summary (Oct. 18, 2004),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004.shtml ('Those who
oppose this proposal include not only major hedge fund groups, industry
participants, the leading trade association representing this industry and top
legal professionals and law firms who represent hedge fund managers, but also
major business groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.").
22. See SEC, STAFF REPORT, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS
(2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf
[hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT].
23. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
69 Fed. Reg. 45,172 (July 28, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279)
[hereinafter Proposed Release].
24. Many of the comments opposing the registration of hedge fund advisers
contested the legal authority of the SEC and provided alternative methods for
the SEC to achieve the same regulatory oversight. See, e.g., Comment Letter
from John G. Gaine, President of Managed Funds Association, to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary, U.S. SEC (Oct. 12, 2004) [hereinafter "MFA Comment"],
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004.shtml (stating that there
is a "long standing recognition by Congress and the SEC, dating back to the
enactment of the Advisers Act in 1940, that any hedge fund or other legal
organization, rather than the individual clients of the hedge fund or
organization, is treated as the client of the adviser"); Comment Letter from Paul
N. Roth, Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. SEC
(Sept. 15, 2004) [hereinafter "SRZ Comment"], available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004.shtml (arguing that "the proposal
oversteps Commission authority" and that the "legislative history of the
Advisers Act and the Investment Company Act indicates that a hedge fund
should be viewed as a single client for purpose of Section 203(b)(3) of the
Advisers Act.").
25. The opposing comments echoed the viewpoints of dissenting
Commissioners Glassman and Atkins, who argued that the new regulation was
not warranted given the costs and problems associated with hedge fund
registration. See Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 72,709.
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and against the registration of hedge fund advisers.26
Rather, this Comment addresses whether the SEC's
Adopting Release articulated a sound basis that justifies
the registration of only hedge fund advisers or whether it
merely created a convenient rationale for the future
registration of private equity advisers.27
Part I of this Comment will discuss the traditional
structure and investment strategies of hedge funds and
private equity funds, highlighting the key terms and
differences between the two types of funds. In Part II, this
Comment discusses the recent trend of financial conver-
gence and how hedge fund advisers are expanding their
investment opportunities to areas traditionally dominated
by private equity advisers. Part III will discuss how both
types of funds rely on nearly identical exemptions to avoid
regulation under the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities
Act),28 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act),29  and the Investment Company Act of 1940
(Investment Company Act). 30 In Part IV, this Comment sets
out how the new rule and rule amendments under the
Advisers Act impact hedge funds and private equity funds
differently. Lastly, Part V of this Comment discusses the
investor protection rationale used to justify only the
registration of hedge funds.
This Comment concludes that the Adopting Release
failed to adequately distinguish private equity funds. Due
to the recent financial convergence, the provision that the
Adopting Release used to separate private equity funds
26. For a detailed discussion and argument against the increase in SEC
regulation, see Greupner, supra note 3. See also Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund
Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 684 (2000); Adam R. Bolter,
Regulation of Hedge Fund Advisers: A Valid Exercise of Rulemaking Authority
Or The Promulgation of New Law?, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 595 (2005) (arguing that
a reviewing court would be justified in finding the new hedge fund adviser
registration rules to be an unlawful extension of the SEC's rulemaking
authority); Jonathan H. Gatsik, Hedge Funds: The Ultimate Game of Liar's
Poker, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 591 (2001) (discussing the pros and cons
associated with more regulation).
27. Comment Letter from Mark G. Heesen, President, Nat'l Venture Capital
Ass'n, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, U.S. SEC, at 6 (Sept. 15, 2004) available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004.shtml
28. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (2000).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (2000).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 80(a) (2000).
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from registration has become even less meaningful. In
addition, the rationale that the Adopting Release used to
justify the regulation is not specific to hedge fund advisers
and can easily be applied to private equity advisers. Thus,
by neither recognizing a more substantive distinction be-
tween the two types of funds nor providing a rationale that
only applies to hedge fund advisers, the Adopting Release
lays a solid foundation for the future registration of private
equity advisers. 31
I. STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY OF HEDGE FUNDS AND
PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS
This Comment discusses two categories of investment
funds-hedge funds and private equity funds-in which
various investors pool money to invest in certain
securities. 32 Both types of funds are managed by a team of
skilled investment professionals that solicit investors
directly, rather than through general advertising, a
registered broker-dealer, or a public offering.33 The funds
are generally organized as limited partnerships (LP) or
limited liability companies (LLC).34 A management com-
pany, which acts as an investment adviser, usually holds
the general partnership interest of a LP or acts as a
managing member of a LLC. 35 Investors usually consist of
high net-worth individuals and families, pension funds,
endowments, banks, and insurance companies.36
Because of these and other general similarities, hedge
fund advisers and private equity fund advisers have a long
31. Comment Letter from Mark G. Heesen, supra note 27, at 8.
32. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 22, at 7.
33. PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING, supra note 1, at 12.
34. The funds are organized this way to take advantage of pass-through tax
treatment where tax liability generated from profitable investments is not
separately taxed at the entity level, but is instead passed on to the individual
investor. See Alan L. Kennard, The Hedge Fund Versus the Mutual Fund, 57
TAX LAw 133, 136 (2003) (discussing the taxation of various private investment
vehicles).
35. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL
MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT 1 (1999) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP].
36. Id. Liability for investors is limited as either a limited partner of a LP or
as a member of a LLC.
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history of being treated similarly by the SEC. 37 Specifically,
the funds that they manage have generally been able to
avoid regulation by using the same exemptions under
federal securities laws.38 However, notwithstanding the
recent trend of financial convergence, these two types of
funds have traditionally differed with respect to their
investment philosophies and key partnership terms.39
Although there is no standard or statutory definition of
a hedge fund,40 the term is generally used to describe a
wide range of investment vehicles with different strategies,
structures, and fee arrangements. 41 Hedge funds employ
various trading strategies 42 and invest in multiple securi-
ties, including debt and equity securities, futures,43
options,44 and foreign currencies. 45 However, certain charac-
37. Compare PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING, supra note 1, at 24-35, with
Lederman, supra note 1, at 11-14-11-25.
38. Compare PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING, supra note 1, at 24-35, with
Lederman, supra note 1, at 11-14--11-25.
39. Compare PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING, supra note 1, at 11 with Lederman,
supra note 1, at 11-3-11-6.
40. See Brandon Becket & Colleen Doherty-Minicozzi, Hedge Funds in
Global Financial Markets, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN UNREGISTERED INVESTMENT
VEHICLES 159, 164 (2000) [hereinafter NEW DIRECTIONS].
41. One law review article defines hedge funds "as privately offered,
relatively unregulated pooled investment vehicles in the form of limited
partnerships or limited liability companies that have the flexibility to invest in
a broad range of securities and commodities using a broad range of trading
techniques." Greupner, supra note 3, at 1559.
42. There are many different categories of hedge funds. For example, some
specific hedge fund strategies include: "event driven" funds, which focus on
events such as mergers and acquisitions, tender offers and distress transactions
such as bankruptcy, liquidations, and financial reorganizations; "market
neutral" funds, which make long and short position investments to offset the
systematic risk of market; "sectoral" funds, which invest in companies in
specific sectors of the economy; "relative value" funds, which search for
undervalued securities compared to their growth prospects; "global asset
allocator" or "macro funds," which use leverage to make global investments in
companies, countries, and currencies; and "funds of funds", which are hedge
funds that make investments in other hedge funds. Gibson, supra note 26, at
685-86. See also PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supra note 35, at 3.
43. Futures are standardized agreements that require the delivery of some
underlying commodity or financial instrument at a future date at a specified
price. Gibson, supra note 26, at 684 n.19.
44. Options are contracts that give the investor the right to buy or sell a
specified financial instrument during a designated period of time for a
designated price. Id. at 684 n.20.
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teristics are common among hedge funds and can be used to
distinguish them from other types of investment funds. 46
A common feature of hedge funds is that they typically
seek absolute returns.47 In addition, the informal firm
cultures promote flexibility in the way that hedge fund
advisers manage their funds.48 Advisers have the authority
to take both long and short positions in securities, providing
the opportunity to exploit temporary market inefficiencies
in both bull and bear markets.49 In general, they enter in to
and out of positions rapidly and on a short term basis, using
leverage as an additional tool to increase gains. 50
Because hedge funds invest in liquid securities with
readily attainable market values, the overall value of a fund
can be determined on a regular basis.51 Fund assets are
"marked-to-market," 52 allowing advisers to take both asset
management fees as well as an additional incentive
amount, based on the fund's performance, at certain
intervals. 53 Fees are calculated based on the net asset value
45. Id. at 684.
46. Three common features of hedge funds are that "(1) hedge fund advisory
fees are based on the fund's performance; (2) they use leverage in a more
aggressive fashion; and, (3) they pursue short-term investment strategies."
PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supra note 35, at A-1.
47. An absolute returns strategy does not focus on outperforming a specific
index or benchmark. Instead, by pursuing an absolute returns strategy, hedge
funds seek to make their investors money irrespective of the way that the
markets move. Greupner, supra note 3, at 1559.
48. Traditional hedge funds usually hold small interests in a larger number
of securities and it is common for managers to hold these securities for a mere
matter of days, hours, or even minutes. Saffayeh & Lotem, supra note 2, at 15.
49. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supra note 35, at 5.
50. Id. at 4. By employing large amounts of leverage, a fund can make
sizable profits over small moves in security prices. See Gibson, supra note 26, at
687 ("The use of leverage by a hedge fund can result in tremendous profit if the
fund makes more money than its borrowing cost."). However, leverage also
increases the risk of the fund. The risk of loss from a high level of leverage can
impact investors, creditors, and the financial markets in general. Id.
51. Saffayeh & Lotem, supra note 2, at 15.
52. Marked-to-market is the term used to describe the periodic valuation of
assets and liabilities securities at current market values. PRESIDENT'S WORKING
GROUP, supra note 35, at 4.
53. Most hedge funds are structured to pay management fees and incentive
performance fees to the fund manager on an ongoing periodic basis based on
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of the fund.54 Since assets can be reduced to cash or
invested quickly, funds usually permit investors to with-
draw and subscribe at regular intervals. 55 Hedge funds
"offer their investors liquidity access following an initial
'lock-up' 56 period, which is typically for less than two
years."57
Unlike hedge fund advisers, private equity advisers
concentrate fund assets in illiquid securities that do not
actively trade in public markets. 58 Many private equity
advisers specialize in providing expansion capital for stable
businesses, making leveraged buyouts, management buy-
outs, or turnarounds of under-performing companies. 59 In
these types of transactions, private equity advisers seek to
create value by engaging in operational, managerial, and
strategic changes to portfolio companies.6 0
Similarly, while most hedge funds have indefinite lives,
most private equity funds are established for a fixed term.6 1
This fixed term usually lasts for ten years and consists of
an investment period and a holding period. 62 During the
investment period, which consists of the first three to five
years of the fund, the adviser identifies portfolio companies
both realized and unrealized gains of the fund. Convergence of Hedge Funds,
supra note 2, at 2.
54. Judd, supra note 2. Hedge funds generally receive a one to two percent
management fee and a twenty percent performance based fee once the fund
reaches a certain level of profitability. The asset management fee is usually
paid quarterly, while the incentive allocation is usually payable annually. Id.
55. Hedge funds generally offer monthly, quarterly, or semi-annual liquidity
to investors. Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 72,074.
56. "Lock-up" is a term to describe the time where the investor cannot
withdraw money from the fund. Id.
57. Id.
58. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 22, at 7.
59. PRIVATE EQuITY INVESTING, supra note 1, at 11.
60. Traditionally, private equity fund managers create value for their clients
through a hands-on approach that involves a long-term commitment to work
with or take active control over the management of the fund's portfolio
companies. Investments of this nature typically require a long time horizon
since it may take years before the value added by the private equity manager is
recognized through a subsequent sale of the portfolio company. Saffayeh &
Lotem, supra note 2, at 15.
61. Breslow & Gutman, supra note 2, at 10.
62. Id.
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and new investments are made.63 The investment period is
followed by a holding period, which lasts an additional five
to seven years, where little new investment is permitted
and existing investments are managed and developed.64
Unlike hedge funds, which usually continue to admit
new investors over the life of the fund,65 private equity
funds typically have a ramp-up period of about six months
to a year, after which the fund is closed to new investors. 66
Once an investment is made, these funds offer little, if any,
liquidity67 by requiring a long lock-up period68 during which
investors cannot withdraw assets from the fund.69 Many
private equity funds permit investor redemptions and
distributions of proceeds only upon realized events, when
the fund's underlying assets are liquidated.70 Similarly,
most private equity funds only make performance fee distri-
butions to advisers after a portfolio company is sold.71
63. Because of the difficulty of finding companies to invest in and the need
for capital in a short time frame, private equity advisers typically require
investors to invest money over the life of a fund in response to "capital calls."
SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 22, at 7. Investors agree to contribute the
required amount of money to fund the purchase of the portfolio company when
it becomes identified. Capital is drawn down from investors as needed up to the
amount of the investors' original capital commitment. Id.
64. Breslow & Gutman, supra note 2, at 10.
65. Hedge funds are "evergreen" in that they continue to allow new capital
to enter the fund on a periodic basis at a price based on the current net asset
value of the fund's assets. Judd, supra note 2, at 3.
66. Breslow & Gutman, supra note 2, at 10.
67. Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 72,073 n.224.
68. This lock-up period usually lasts years from when an investor first
invests and may even last the entire duration of the fund. See Convergence of
Hedge Funds, supra note 2, at 2.
69. See Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 72,073.
70. Judd, supra note 2, at 3.
71. Advisers to private equity funds are paid management fees based on
total capital commitments during the investment period, and actively invested
capital thereafter. Incentive based performance fees are based on actual cash
proceeds received from the operation and disposal of portfolio companies. See
Saffayeh & Lotem, supra note 2, at 15.
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II. FINANCIAL CONVERGENCE OF HEDGE FUNDS
AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS
The distinction between private equity funds and hedge
funds is becoming less obvious despite their traditional
differences. Recent examples of the territorial convergence
of hedge fund and private equity advisers suggest that
there is no longer a clear disparity between the fund
structure and investment strategies that once defined these
funds. 72 While some private equity firms are adding hedge
funds to their product lines, 73  the majority of the
convergence taking place today involves hedge funds that
are broadening their investment strategies to encompass
typical private equity style investments. 74
As investors have rushed into the hedge fund industry,
there has been an increase in the number of new funds
launched and a higher level of competition among existing
funds. 75 New funds and more assets pursuing the same
opportunities have made the markets that hedge funds
have typically invested in more competitive. 76 In response,
some hedge fund advisers have diversified their traditional
investment strategies attempting to maintain their rates of
return.77 Some advisers are now employing activist and
distressed takeover tactics to acquire and restructure
72. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Eying More Turf" Quadrangle Group to Start a
Specialized Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at C6 ("The most notable
example has been that of Eddie Lampert, the star hedge fund manager, acting
like a buyout kingpin with his acquisition of Kmart, followed by a merger with
Sears. And many traditional hedge funds, like Cerberus Capital Management,
are starting to make investments similar to private equity ones, or starting
their own private equity funds."); see also Judd, supra note 2, at 1 ("High profile
examples include Cerberus Capital Management leading a consortium of hedge
funds in the auction for Texas Genco, and Cerberus's $5.5 billion offer for Toys
'R' Us, both bids losing out to a consortium of private equity funds-although
Cerberus was successful in its $2.3 billion buyout of MeadWestvaco.").
73. See Sorkin, supra note 72, at C6 ("[B]ig private equity firms like Texas
Pacific and Bain Capital already have separate hedge funds. Other private
equity firms are actively considering starting hedge funds.").
74. See Judd, supra note 2, at 1.
75. See CORNWELL ET AL., supra note 2, at 3 (stating that it is more difficult
for hedge funds "to achieve the double digit returns their investors were
previously accustomed to.").
76. Judd, supra note 2, at 1
77. CORNWELL ETAL., supra note 2, at 4.
262 [Vol. 54
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companies,7 8 closely resembling the investment approach of
private equity firms. 79
Hedge funds that pursue these strategies face
significant structuring challenges.8 0 The partnership or
operating agreements that dictate the key terms of the
funds must be structured to handle the long-term, illiquid
investments associated with private equity investing.8 1 A
hedge fund that permits investor redemptions on a periodic
basis could face a problem if one or more investors are not
able to redeem their interests because assets are tied up in
illiquid securities.8 2 As a result, the fund could be forced to
exit from a particular security at an inopportune time, at a
lower than expected profit, or before the investment has
had a chance to develop.8 3
The simplest solution to address this concern is for a
hedge fund to restrict the amount of assets invested in
private equity strategies.8 4 Similarly, instead of offering
liquidity to investors on a quarterly or annual basis, some
hedge funds are extending the lock-up period for investor
redemptions.8 5 Furthermore, hedge funds are protecting
against overwhelming redemptions through the use of
"gates" that place a cap on the percentage of assets that can
be withdrawn from the fund.8 6
78. See Breslow & Gutman, supra note 2, at 9.
79. See CORNWELL ET AL., supra note 2, at 3 ("In several recent auctions of
large cap public companies, hedge funds have competed against buyout funds to
acquire the target company.").
80. Id. at 9 ('There are also significant technical and legal hurdles to paying
annual performance fees, and permitting regular subscriptions and
redemptions, when a significant portion of the hedge fund's portfolio is in
illiquid investments.").
81. Convergence of Hedge Funds, supra note 2, at 4.
82. Saffayeh & Lotem, supra note 2, at 32.
83. Convergence of Hedge Funds, supra note 2, at 4.
84. Judd, supra note 2, at 4.
85. Breslow, supra note 9, at 1.
86. See Breslow & Gutman, supra note 2, at 12. "Gates" limit the
percentages of fund capital that can be withdrawn at a specific redemption
date. When a hedge fund receives redemption requests on any redemption date
for a certain percentage of the fund, the fund is entitled to stop redemptions and
defer a portion of the redemptions to a future date until the manager can
handle them better. For example, a manager may impose a 15% gate on annual
redemptions, allowing the manager to continue to invest in illiquid assets and
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However, limiting the portion of the fund in illiquid
securities, lengthening the lock-up period for investors, or
using a gate to reduce unexpected redemptions may not
alleviate all of the problems associated with hedge funds
making traditional private equity investments. Specifically,
asset values may not be easily attained causing the net
asset value of the fund to reflect an inaccurate representa-
tion of the underlying fund holdings.8 7 As a result, the fund
may not be able to accurately determine the management
fee, the performance incentive allocation,88 or the price at
which investors subscribe to and redeem from the fund.
One way that hedge funds are addressing this valuation
concern is by creating a "side pocket" for the illiquid
investments.8 9 Side pockets are separate accounts to which
a percentage of fund assets are allocated for investments
that differ from the main objective of the fund. 90 A side
pocket is treated separately for purposes of calculating the
annual incentive allocation, the management fees, and for
purposes of subscriptions and redemptions. 91 There is
typically an unlimited lock-up period such that investor
withdrawals are permitted only to the extent that the
illiquid assets held in the side pocket are sold. 92
Side pockets, gates, and longer lock-up periods are just
a few examples of terms that hedge funds are adding to
to rest assured that the fund will not experience a liquidity crisis as it
approaches the redemption period. Id.
87. See Convergence of Hedge Funds, supra note 2, at 3.
88. Id. at 4. Hedge fund investors may be unwilling to pay annual
performance fees to an adviser that has invested in illiquid securities that do
not have a readily ascertainable market value. This problem is made worse
when the fund manager, who is also the general partner of the fund, is the one
that has the role of determining the value of the illiquid securities. The fund
manager has an incentive to over value the fund's securities in order to receive
higher compensation. Id.
89. Judd, supra note 2, at 2.
90. Id. at 3 ("Once an asset goes into a side pocket, new investors do not
share in it, and existing investors exiting the hedge fund (by redeeming their
shares) remain invested in the side pocket until the asset is realized .... "); see
also, Breslow & Gutman, supra note 2, at 12.
91. While "management fees in relation to the side pocket are generally paid
by reference to the cost of the asset..." and not its market value, performance
incentive allocations are only paid upon a realization event thereby permitting
an accurate calculation of the manager's profit or loss. Judd, supra note 2, at 3.
92. Id.
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partnership or operating agreements to facilitate the
pursuit of private equity investments. 93 The incorporation
of these types of terms distorts the once obvious distinction
between hedge funds and private equity funds. Though the
future extent of this convergence is unclear, at the current
time, the investment strategies and structures of these two
types of funds appear more similar than ever.
III. FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS
AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS
Despite their traditional differences, hedge funds and
private equity funds have previously been treated similarly
under federal securities laws.94 In general, both types of
funds rely on the same exemptions to avoid regulation
under the Investment Company Act, the Securities Act, and
the Exchange Act. 95 While a comprehensive review of the
securities framework under which hedge funds and private
equity funds operate is outside the scope of this Comment,
it is worth noting a few of the more common exclusions that
these two types of funds rely on to avoid regulation.
Both types of funds typically rely on the same exemp-
tions to avoid registration under the Investment Company
Act.96 Sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) provide exclusions from
the definition of an "investment company."97 Section 3(c)(1)
excludes any issuer whose outstanding securities are
93. Breslow, supra note 9, at 1.
94. Compare PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING, supra note 1, with Lederman,
supra note 1.
95. For a detailed discussion of the exemptions of hedge funds, see Rory B.
O'Halloran, An Overview and Analysis of Recent Interest In Increased Hedge
Fund Regulation, 79 TUL. L. REV. 461 (2004). See also John Hellrung, Hedge
Fund Regulation: Investors are Knocking at the Door, But Can the SEC Clean
House Before Everyone Rushes In?, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 317 (2005). For a
detailed discussion of the exemptions of hedge funds, see PRIVATE EQuITY
INVESTING, supra note 1, at 23-35.
96. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 22, at 11-12; see also PRIVATE EQUITY
INVESTING, supra note 1, at 27-29.
97. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 22, at 11. The Investment Company Act
defines an "investment company" as (1) any issuer that "is or holds itself out as
being engaged primarily ... in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading
in securities" or (2) an issuer that "is engaged or proposes to engage in the
business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in securities." 15
U.S.C. § 80a-(3)(a)(1)(A)(C) (2000).
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beneficially owned by not more than one hundred investors
and does not make a public offering of its securities.98
Similarly, Section 3(c)(7) 99 excludes any issuer that does not
make a public offering and whose outstanding securities are
owned exclusively by persons who are qualified purchasers
at the time they acquire their interests. 100
Hedge funds and private equity funds also typically rely
on the same exceptions to avoid the securities registration
and prospectus delivery requirements of Section 5 of the
Securities Act. 10 1 For issuers making a public offering, 10 2
Section 5 prohibits offers and sales of securities prior to
filing a registration statement with the SEC.10 3 To avoid
the time consuming and expensive requirements involved
with complying with this section, both private equity funds
and hedge funds typically rely on Section 4(2), which
exempts issuers from the requirements of Section 5 so long
as the "transactions by an issuer [are] not involving any
public offering."'1 4 Similarly, both funds mostly rely on Rule
98. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-(3)(c)(1) (2000).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-(3)(c)(7) (2000). Section 3(c)(7) allows funds to sell
interests to a greater number of investors than § 3(c)(1). However, most funds
that take advantage of the 3(c)(7) exclusion limit the number of investors in the
fund to 499 so that the registration and reporting requirements of the
Securities Exchange Act are not triggered. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(B)
(requiring every issuer with at least 500 equity holders of record to register
with the SEC).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51) (2000). A 'qualified purchaser" is "(i) any
natural person who owns not less than $5 million in investments ... (ii) a
family-owned company that owns not less than $5 million in investments, (iii)
certain trusts, and (iv) any other person . . . that owns and invests on a
discretionary basis not less than $25 million in investments." PRESIDENT'S
WORKING GROUP, supra note 35, at B-3. There is no limit to the number of
"qualified purchasers" for a fund to avoid SEC registration. See PRIVATE EQUITY
INVESTING, supra note 1, at 19.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
102. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines "security" broadly to
include "participation in any profit-sharing agreement" and "investment
contract[s]" among other things. The cases interpreting this section have held
that any investment contract where a "person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party .... " is a security. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299
(1946). This broad definition of securities includes interests in private equity
and hedge funds. PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING, supra note 1, at 29 n.41.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2000).
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506 under Regulation D 105 to satisfy the requirements of a
private offering.10 6 Thus, interests in both types of funds
are usually sold only to "accredited investors."1 07
Another exclusion from registration shared by private
equity funds and hedge funds involves broker and dealer
registration under the Exchange Act. Both types of funds
are not considered brokers because they are not "engaged in
the business of effecting transactions in securities for the
accounts of others."108 In addition, both types of funds are
not considered dealers,1 09 because they fall under the
"trader exception" which exempts funds that do not buy and
sell securities as part of a regular business." 0 Furthermore,
both types of funds limit the number of owners to fewer
than 500 because Section 12(g) and Rule 12g-1 of the
Exchange Act require issuers "having 500 holders of record
of a class of equity security ... and assets in excess of $10
million" to register the security.111
105. Regulation D acts as a safe harbor, which assures compliance with §
4(2), for issuers that want to avoid the § 5 requirements of a public offering. An
issuer can still meet the requirements of § 4(2) without relying on Regulation D
if the issuer can show that the offering was made to sophisticated investors that
are able to fend for themselves. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119
(1953).
106. In addition, hedge funds and private equity funds must refrain from
general solicitation and meet certain resale restrictions on the securities sold.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2005) (prohibiting general solicitation or general
advertising). See also 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d) (2005) (prohibiting the resale of
securities acquired in a transaction under § 4(2)).
107. Rule 501(a), in general terms, defines an "accredited investor" to
include eight categories of offerees and purchasers, including wealthy or
financially sophisticated investors such as banks and insurance companies. See
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2005) (detailing the eight categories of offerees and
purchasers). While there is no limit placed on the number of accredited
investors that can participate in a private placement, the number of non-
accredited investors that can participate is limited to thirty-five. 17 C.F.R. §
230.506(b) (2005).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2000). Hedge funds and private equity funds
engage in securities transactions for their own accounts, rather than for the
accounts of others. See id.
109. The Exchange Act defines dealers as "person[s] engaged in the business
of buying and selling securities for his own account .... ".15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(5)(2000).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(B) (2000 & Supp. II 2002); Gibson, supra note 26,
at 692.
111. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(g)(2000); 17 C.F.R. §240.12g-1(2005).
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IV. HEDGE FUND ADVISER REGISTRATION
Effective February 2006, amended Rule 203(b)(3)-1 and
new Rule 203(b)(3)-2 under the Advisers Act, require the
majority of hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC. 112
These rule changes create a look through provision where
regulators will look beyond the legal entities of certain
private fund advisers to determine the actual number of
clients of the adviser. 113 The new rule and rule amendments
treat hedge fund advisers and private equity advisers
differently. Oddly enough, this new regulation comes at a
time when the investment strategy and structure dispari-
ties between the two types of funds appear to be at their
narrowest point.
The Advisers Act requires all "investment advisers" 114
that have a certain level 1 5 of assets under management to
register with the SEC, unless a specific exemption is
available. 116 In order to avoid registration, both hedge fund
and private equity fund advisers used to rely on an
112. Adopting Release, supra note 10. Registration requires the
maintenance of certain books, records, and other compliance procedures that
are meant to provide the financial media, the SEC, and other regulatory bodies
with better access to information about specific fund operations. In general,
registered and unregistered advisers are treated similarly under the Advisers
Act. All investment advisers are subject to all of the requirements of the
Advisers Act and its applicable rules, regardless of whether they are registered.
Like registered advisers, unregistered advisers are considered fiduciaries and
are subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the Advisers Act. See SEC v. Capital
Gains Research, 375 U.S. 180, 196-97 (1963) (affirming an adviser's status as a
fiduciary).
113. Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 72,054.
114. Section 202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act defines an "investment adviser"
to mean "any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising
other, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities." 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)
(2000). The term investment adviser includes the management companies that
advise both hedge funds and private equity funds about the securities
purchased by the funds. See Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 870-71 (2d
Cir. 1977) (holding that managers to hedge funds meet the definition of
investment advisers under the Advisers Act).
115. Advisers with less than $25 million in assets do not have to register
with the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(1)(A)(2000).
116. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a)-(b) (2000).
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exemption found in Section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act.117
This section provides a private adviser exemption for an
adviser with fewer than fifteen clients during the preceding
twelve months, that does not hold itself out 118 to the public,
and that is not an adviser to a registered investment
company. 119
Under the old SEC rules pertaining to this section, if an
adviser made investment decisions for a group of investors
as a single entity, the group of investors could be treated as
a single client. 120 This allowed hedge funds and private
equity funds to treat an entire limited partnership as one
client so long as the advice provided to the partnership "is
based on the investment objectives of the limited partner-
ship rather than those of the various limited partners."121
As a result, even though there may be a large number of
individuals that actually make up the entity, an adviser
could take advantage of the Section 203(b)(3) exemption so
long as it advised less than fifteen legal entities.122 Hedge
fund and private equity fund advisers took advantage of
this loophole to manage multiple "funds having hundreds of
117. The Advisers Act contains other exemptions from registration. For
example, the Advisers Act exempts from registration "any investment adviser
all of whose clients are residents of the State within which such investment
adviser maintains his or its principal office and place of business, and who does
not furnish advise or issue analyses or reports with respect to securities listed
or admitted to unlisted trading privileges on any national securities exchange."
15 U.S.C. §80b-3(b)(1). Also, the Advisers Act provides an exemption from to
advisers whose only clients are insurance companies (15 U.S.C. §80b-3(b)(2)); to
charitable organizations and their officials (15 U.S.C. §80b-3(b)(4)); to church
plans (15 U.S.C. §80b-3(b)(5)); and to commodity trading advisors registered
with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (15 U.S.C. §80b-3(b)(6)).
118. See Gibson, supra note 26, at 698 (A party holds itself out by
maintaining a listing as an investment adviser in a telephone or business
directory, by an expression of willingness to existing clients or others to accept
new clients, or through the use of letterhead indicating any activity as an
investment adviser.).
119. 15 U.S.C. §80b-3(b)(3) (2000).
120. Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 72,055.
121. Proposed Release, supra note 23, at 45,182.
122. However, the SEC does not require advisers to look through every
business or other legal organization for the purposes of determining the
availability of the private adviser exemption. Advisers are not required to look
through most clients that are business organizations, insurance companies,
broker-dealers, and banks. Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 72,073.
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investors, and tens of millions of dollars of assets, without
registering.. ." with the SEC.123
In contrast, new Rule 203(b)(3)-2 requires investment
advisers to count each shareholder, limited partner,
member, or beneficiary of a private fund as a client.124 The
SEC also amended Rule 203(b)(3)-1 to define a private fund
as a company (1) that would be an investment company
under Section 3(a) of the Investment Company Act but for
the exception provided from that definition by either
Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7); (2) that permits its
owners 125 to redeem any portion of their ownership
interests within two years of the purchase of such
interests; 126 and (3) whose interests in which are or have
been offered based on the investment advisory skills, ability
or expertise of the investment adviser. This definition is
specifically intended to "include most hedge fund advisers,
but . . . exclude advisers that manage only private equity
funds, . . ."127 As a result, hedge fund advisers must look
through their funds to count the actual number of
individual investors. They can no longer avoid registration
under the Advisers Act if, during the preceding twelve
months, they have advised a fund that had over fourteen
investors. 128
123. Proposed Release, supra note 23, at 45,182.
124. Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 72,065.
125. The term "owners" includes advisers, general partners and
knowledgeable employees that have invested in the fund. The SEC did not
adopt an exclusion for insiders in rule 203(b)(3)-l(d). See Letter from the SEC to
Robert Lang & Paul N. Roth, ABA Subcomm. on Private Investment Entities,
(Dec. 8, 2005) available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/invesmtnet/noaction/
aba120805.htm, at 2.
126. The two-year lock-up provision applies to each amount of capital
contributed to the fund. However, an investment pool is not a private fund if it
permits its owners to redeem their ownership interest within two years of the
purchase of such interest only in the case of events found after a reasonable
inquiry to be extraordinary at the time the interest was issued. Adopting
Release, supra note 10, at 72,074. The dissolution or liquidation of an owner
that is organized as a limited partnership or limited liability company,
corporation, or any other type of entity will likely constitute an extraordinary
event and will not cause the fund to be considered a private fund that is subject
to the new look through provisions. See SEC Letter to Robert Land & Paul N.
Roth, supra note 125, at 2.
127. Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 72,074.
128. Id. at 72,065.
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Of these three characteristics that the Adopting
Release uses to define a private fund, the two-year
"redemption period is the only criterion that would
distinguish most hedge funds from most other types of
private funds."'129 Like hedge funds, almost all private
equity funds rely on the Section 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) exemp-
tions in the Investment Company Act. 130 In addition,
private equity funds are often offered based on the adviser's
history, experience, past performance, strategies and
record. 31 However, most private equity funds do not meet
the definition of a private fund because of their longer
investor lock-up periods. 13 2 Therefore, most private equity
advisers do not have to look through their funds to count
the number of underlying investors as clients and can still
count a fund as consisting of one client for the purposes of
the Advisers Act. 133
V. CREATING A RATIONALE FOR THE FUTURE REGISTRATION
OF PRIVATE EQUITY ADVISERS
This is not the first time that the SEC has considered
increasing its oversight of hedge funds. The collapse of
Long-Term Capital Management 134  in 1998 and the
subsequent bailout 135 of the fund fueled an intense debate
129. Id. at 72,096.
130. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 22, at 11-12. See also PRIVATE
EQUITY INVESTING, supra note 1, at 27-29.
131. See PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING, supra note 1, at 13.
132. Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 72,074.
133. See id.
134. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED (2000) (describing the
rise and fall of Long-Term Capital Management). Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM) was a large hedge fund founded in 1994. LTCM sought to
profit from a variety of trading strategies, but the distinguishing factor of the
fund was the large size of its positions in certain markets and the extent of its
leverage. The fund incurred significant financial difficulty in 1998, leading to its
demise. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supra note 35, at 10-12. See also Gibson,
supra note 26, at 681.
135. Due to an extraordinary move in the currency markets, the LTCM's
creditors feared they would lose a substantial portion of the amount they
extended to the fund. In response, the creditors created a consortium which
injected $3.6 billion in equity into LTCM. Anita Raghavan & Mitchell Pacelle,
To the Rescue: A Hedge Fund Falters and Wall Street Giants Ante Up $3.5
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on private investment fund regulation. 136 However, while
the 1998 "debate focused on market integrity and the
dangers posed by very large, unregulated, and leveraged
hedge funds . . . , the current . . . debate is focused on
investor protection."'137 The Adopting Release primarily
justifies the registration of only hedge fund advisers by
citing the incidence of fraud138 and the broadening exposure
of hedge funds to less affluent investors. 139
The core justification described in the Adopting Release
deals with the "substantial record of frauds associated with
hedge funds."' 40 While focusing on certain examples of
fraud relating only to hedge fund advisers, the Adopting
Release acknowledged that private equity funds "are
similar to hedge funds in some respects."141 However,
Billion, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 1998, at Al. See also PRESIDENT'S WORKING
GROUP, supra note 35, at 13.
136. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supra note 35, at 10-17
(assessing the systemic risks of hedge funds to the global financial markets).
137. Greupner, supra note 3, at 1558. See also Laura Edwards, Looking
Through The Hedges: How the SEC Justified Its Decision To Require
Registration of Hedge Fund Advisers, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 603 (2005).
138. See Former Chairman William H. Donaldson, Testimony Concerning
Investor Protection and the Regulation of Hedge Funds Advisers, Before the
U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, at 5 (July,
2004) [hereinafter Donaldson Testimony] (describing the types of fraud that the
SEC has seen to "include gross overstatement of performance by hedge fund
advisers (at times when investors were actually losing money), payment of
unnecessary and undisclosed commissions, and misappropriation of client
assets by using parallel unregistered advisory firms and hedge funds.").
However, the SEC not only expressed concerned with adviser fraud on hedge
fund investors, but also concern about fraud in connection with other market
participants, such as mutual funds. See Adopting Release, supra note 10, at
72,057 ("Most disturbing is that hedge fund advisers have been key participants
in the recent scandals involving late trading and inappropriate market timing
of mutual fund shares."). While the SEC brought only fifty-one cases of fraud
relating to hedge fund advisers, approximately four hundred hedge funds were
connected with the mutual fund scandals of 2003. Edwards, supra note 137, at
624.
139. The Adopting Release rationalized that the new rule and rule
amendments were warranted "in light of the growth of hedge funds, the
broadening exposure of investors to hedge fund risk, and the growing number of
instances of malfeasance by hedge fund advisers .... " Adopting Release, supra
note 10, at 72,059.
140. Id. at 72,057.
141. Id. at 72,074. However, in a previous staff report, the SEC found "no
evidence indicating that hedge funds or their advisers engage
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private equity advisers were allowed to remain unregis-
tered because the SEC "has not encountered significant
enforcement problems with respect to their management of
private equity . . . funds."'142 According to the Adopting
Release, private equity funds were not required to register
"because they have not been implicated in as many
enforcement actions as advisers to hedge funds have
been."143
The other major concern addressed in the Adopting
Release surrounded "the growing exposure of smaller
investors, pensioners, and other market participants,
directly or indirectly, to hedge funds."'144 Here, the SEC did
not even attempt to distinguish private equity funds.
Instead, the Adopting Release focused specifically on the
broader exposure of hedge funds to less affluent investors,
stating that "a growing number of public and private
pension funds, as well as university endowments, founda-
tions and other charitable organizations, have begun to
invest in . . . or have increased their allocation to hedge
funds."'145 In particular, the SEC expressed apprehension
that the "development of 'funds of funds' has made hedge
funds more broadly available to investors."'146
While the Adopting Release repeatedly expressed the
SEC's view that "private equity funds are beyond the scope"
of the rule changes, it is unclear whether private equity
advisers will be able to remain unregistered. 147 Taken as a
whole, the Adopting Release "upon which the rule is based
does not present a rationale for regulating hedge funds that
could not at some point be used to expand SEC regulation
disproportionately in fraudulent activity" compared to private equity advisers.
SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 22, at 72; see also Donaldson Testimony, supra
note 138, at 5 ("I am not suggesting that hedge funds or their advisers engage
disproportionately in fraudulent activities. The frauds . . .[the SEC] see[s] in
hedge funds generally are not unique to hedge funds.).
142. Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 72,074.
143. Id. at 72,096.
144. Id. at 72,056.
145. Id. at 72,057-58.
146. Id. at 72,057. In the Adopting Release, the SEC refers to the movement
of hedge funds down market to retail consumers, and not just high net worth
individuals, as the "retailization" of hedge funds. Id.
147. Id. at 72,096.
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to ... private equity."'148 Investors are just as susceptible to
fraud and valuation misrepresentations when dealing with
advisers to private equity funds. 149 In some cases, investors
may even require more protection when dealing with
private equity advisers since their money is typically tied
up for longer periods of time. 150 Although there have not
been as many cases of private equity fraud, it is clear that a
person with the "intent of defrauding investors can call
themselves whatever they choose. ."..",151 Similarly, pension
funds, foundations, and endowments have long been
investment partners with private equity firms. 152 If the
SEC has required the registration of hedge fund advisers
because of their exposure to these types of clients, it is
foreseeable that private equity advisers could also face
registration. 153
Furthermore, the SEC may now have more reason to
revisit their decision to allow private equity funds to remain
unregistered. During the public comment period for the new
rule and rule amendments, critics already noted'5 that the
two-year lock-up period "is not an economic or regulatory
distinction, [but] merely the practice of some types of firms.
148. Comment Letter from Brian T. Borders, Counsel to the Nat'l Venture
Capital Ass'n, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, U.S. SEC, at 1 (Oct. 21, 2004)
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004.shtml.
149. Comment Letter from Mark G. Heesen, supra note 27, at 7 ("Absent a
clear distinction and more compelling rationale from the Commission for
regulating hedge funds and not venture capital or private equity, we do not see
this proposal as providing a sound SEC regulatory policy toward venture capital
and private equity.").
150. Convergence of Hedge Funds, supra note 2, at 2.
151. See Comment Letter from Brian T. Borders, supra note 148, at 1.
152. Comment Letter from Mark G. Heesen, supra note 27, at 7. A large
percentage of private fund "capital commitments come from sophisticated
institutional investors-pension funds, insurance companies, university
endowments and foundations." Id. at 2.
153. Id. at 7.
154. Comment Letter from Franklin L. Widmann, NASAA President and
Chief, NJ Bureau of Sec., to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, U.S. SEC, at 2 (Oct. 18,
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/flwidmann
101804.pdf. (stating that the definition of a private fund "is ineffective at
distinguishing hedge funds from private equity, venture capital, and commodity
pools."); see also Comment Letter from Mark Heesen, supra note 27, at 8
(reasoning that the grounds on which the majority distinguished venture
capital funds from hedge funds are not meaningful.).
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.."155 Thus, determining which types of funds must
register based on this criterion "seem[s] . .. to be somewhat
arbitrary."156 Furthermore, although the future extent of
the current financial convergence is uncertain, 157 a new
breed of hedge funds-set up to hold a mix of illiquid and
liquid assets-is blurring the lines between traditional
hedge funds and private equity funds. 158 As hedge funds
pursue private equity investments, the two-year lock-up
provision is becoming an even less meaningful way of
distinguishing between the two types of funds. Some hedge
funds are lengthening their lock-up periods beyond two
years, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of the Adopting
Release's definition of a private fund.
A more concrete way to ensure that traditional private
equity funds are treated separately from hedge funds would
have been for the Adopting Release to implement a
definition that takes into account "portfolio content or
frequency of trading .... ,,159 A "distinguishing factor that
differentiates [traditional] private equity . . . funds from
hedge funds is that the managers of the former do not ...
'actively trade' the securities held in the fund."160 In
addition, the Adopting Release could have applied "a test
that focuses on the marketability of a fund's holdings" since
traditional private equity funds likely have nearly all of
their assets in illiquid private companies. 161
Alternatively, the Adopting Release could have
distanced private equity advisers by focusing on certain
155. Comment Letter from Rebecca McEnally, CFA Institute for Fin. Mktg.
Integrity, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. SEC, at 6 (Sept. 30, 2004),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/rmcenally 093004.pdf.
156. Id.
157. Even though the convergence taking place will not likely result in a
complete convergence of traditional hedge funds and private equity funds, the
new hybrid structures that are employing strategies and terms from both types
of funds may put pressure on the SEC to reassess its definition of a "private
fund."
158. Breslow, supra note 9, at 1.
159. Adopting Release, supra note 10, at 72,096.
160. Comment Letter from Franklin L. Widmann, supra note 154.
161. Comment Letter from the Board of Trustees of the Greenwich
Roundtable, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. SEC (Sept. 15, 2004)
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73004/greenwhich0915.htm.
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macroeconomic risks specific to hedge funds.162  For
instance, some hedge funds have a significant impact on
and present certain risks to the financial markets that do
not necessarily apply to private equity funds. 163 While
hedge funds are similar to private equity funds with respect
to their ability to harm individual investors, the funds have
traditionally differed with respect to the amount of systemic
risk involved. 164 Whereas the collapse of a large highly
levered hedge fund has the potential to create a giant shock
to the world economy,165  losses on private equity
investments generally tend to remain isolated to the
individuals and firms involved with the particular deal. 166
162. See Edwards, supra note 137, at 625-26 ("With the dramatic growth of
the number of people connected to the hedge fund industry and with the
increase in the amount invested in the funds, the SEC could have emphasized
the macroeconomic effects a crash like LTCM would have on the global capital
markets.").
163. Gibson, supra note 26, at 685 ("In relation to other U.S. financial
markets, hedge fund investing represents only a small section of the investing
community. However, hedge funds have the potential to impact the U.S.
financial markets significantly because, unlike mutual funds and pension
funds, hedge funds engage in more active, short-term trading and use leverage
more aggressively."). See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 40, at 163 (suggesting
that hedge funds threaten the global financial markets with high use of
leverage).
164. See Gibson, supra note 26, at 682 (concluding that "private market
regulation, through the exercise of more diligent market discipline by both
hedge funds and those entities that extend credit to hedge funds, is needed to
protect against systemic loss"). Systemic risk is the risk that a market
participant will default on its obligations, which will cause other market
participants to default on their obligations, which in the aggregate could have a
large impact on financial markets. See id. at 704.
165. If LTCM's trading positions were dissolved too quickly, it could have
created "extreme price movements and cause[d] some markets to temporarily
cease functioning." PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supra note 35, at 2.
166. Hedge Funds' "potential impact on public securities markets clearly
involves a much higher degree of SEC interest in their regulation." Comment
Letter from Mark G. Heesen, supra note 27, at 4; see also Gibson, supra note 26,
at 705 ("Perhaps the most convincing argument for implementing regulation
specifically directed at hedge fund trading is the prevention of systemic loss, to
address the possibility that a major market participant's loss in the financial
markets may cause widespread loss at other firms, or cause financial disruption
in other market segments or in the entire financial system.").
2006] CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE
CONCLUSION
In the past, the investment styles of hedge funds and
private equity funds were well defined and distinct. Today,
that is no longer the case. Increased competition in
traditional hedge fund markets is causing some hedge fund
advisers to pursue private equity investment opportunities.
In particular, some hedge funds are lengthening the
investor lock-up period beyond the two year period that the
Adopting Release used to define a "private fund." Thus, the
SEC may have to reassess this definition and reconsider
whether it remains a meaningful distinction between
private equity funds and hedge funds. Considering the
longstanding history of similar regulation under federal
securities laws for these two types of funds, the SEC may
also choose to reevaluate its decision to allow private equity
funds to remain unregistered. If this occurs, the Adopting
Release and the investor protection rationale upon which it
is based may be used as a justification for the registration
of private equity fund advisers.
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